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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-AuTHORITY OF ATTORNEY-PRESUMPTION.-
MILLER V. CONTINENTAL ASSN. Co. OF AM., I34 S. W., I003 (Mo.). Held,
that where a duly licensed and practicing attorney appears in a court of
record as the representative of a party, there is a strong presumption that
he is authorized so to appear, and he may not in general be required to
establish his authority to do so, except at the instance of the court or his
client.
Although it is necessary that an attorney be specially authorized to act
for a client, his position as an officer of the court makes it unnecessary
for him in the ordinary case, to show his authority in any way, there being
a firmly established presumption in favor of it. Osborn v. United States,
9 Wheat., 738; Hill v. Mendenhall, 21 Wall., 453. In spite of this favor-
able presumption, however, there is a well recognized discretion in the
court to call for proof of an attorney's authority when it sees fit. King of
Spain v. Oliver, 14 Fed., Case No. 7814; New York v. Purdy, 36 Barb.
(N. Y.), 266. Moreover, either party may question an attorney's author-
ity to represent his alleged client. People v. Mariposa Co., 39 Cal., 683;
Hess v. Cole, 23 N. J. L., 116. But his authority to appear can not be
c, ntroverted on the trial by evidence outside the issues in the case. Ind.
Bloomington & Western Ry. v. Maddy, IO3 Ind., 20o. Furthermore the
application for the plaintiff's attorney to show authority should be made
before plea is filed. Reece v. Reece, 66 N. C., 377; Campbell v. Gal-
breath, 5 Watts (Pa.), 423. But the defendant's attorney may be required
to show his authority even after he has filed a plea, at the request of the
plaintiff. Blood v. Westbrook, 5o Mich., 443. Again, pleading the general
issue seems to be a waiver of all objections to attorney's authority. Lucus
v. Georgia Bank, 2 Stew. (Ala.), 147. And by a well settled rule, the
question of an attorney's authority to represent an alleged client can not,
it is held, be raised collaterally. Pressly v. Lamb, io5 Ind., 171. Or
upon demurrer. Gibson v. State, 59 Miss., 341. Nor should it be set up
in a pleading. North Brunswick Tp. v. Booream, 1O N. J. L., 257. But
must be raised on motion directly for that purpose and supported by
affidavits. Williams v. Butler, 35 Ill., 544.
AuToMoBILEs-INJuRY EROmi AUTOMOBILE USED nY BORROWER-OWNER'S
LIABILITY.-HARTLEY V. MILLER, 130 N. W., 336 (MIcH.),-Held, that, in
the absence of statutory provision, an owner of an automobile is not liable
for personal injury caused by a borrower's negligence, on the theory that
an automobile is a dangerous instrumentality, though the owner was in
the car at the time; the borrower being in control.
The owner of a vehicle is not liable for an injury caused by the negli-
gent driving of a borrower, if it was not used at the time of the injury
in the business of the owner. Doran v. Thomsen, 74 N. J. L., 445. Nor
is the owner of an automobile liable for injuries caused by the car when
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it is in the possession of a purchaser who is to pay the price out of the
proceeds of hiring same. Braverman v Hart, ios N. Y. Supp., io7. Nor
is the owner liable when his son is in the machine, but not with his permis-
sion, nor under his control. Reynolds v. Buck, 127 Iowa, 6or. But the owner
is liable when the injury is committed while his servant is using the car
in the course of his employment. Curley v. Electrical Vehicle Co., 74
N. Y. Supp., 35. However, when the negligent parties are driving an
automobile of their employer, but not engaged in his business, nor under
his control, there is no lability on their master. Clark v. Buckmobile Co.,
94 N. Y. Supp., 771. The mere proof of ownership of the automobile by
defendant, without evidence that the machine was being used in the course
of his business, is not sufficient to establish defendant's liability.Lotz v.
Hanlon, 217 Pa., 339. A chauffeur, who, in violation of his employer's
instructions, takes out the latter's automobile for his own pleasure, is
not acting within the scope of his employment, and his employer is not
liable to strangers for his negligence. Stewart v. Baruch, 93 N. Y. Supp.,
161; Patterson v. Kates, 152 Fed., 481. Hence, when plaintiff introduces
defendant's chauffeur as a witness, and the latter testifies that he was
employed by defendant, but on cross-examination by defendant admits
that he was engaged in the prosecution of his own business, contrary to
the orders of defendant, at the time of the accident, his testimony justifies
the court in granting a non-suit. Quigley v. Thompson, 211 Pa., 1o.
Where plaintiff is injured through the negligence of a chauffeur, who is
acting contrary to the orders of his employer, the mere fact that defendant
knew that he was careless does not make him liable, since his continued
employment of a careless servant is not the proximate cause of the injury.
Danforth v. Fisher, 75 N. H., xii; Jones v. Hoge, 47 Wash., 663. The
weight of authority would seem to be that an automobile is not per se
a dangerous instrumentality. Steffen v. McNaughton, 142 Wis., 49; Slater
v. Thresher Co., 97 Minn., 305; McIntyre v. Orner, i66 Ind., 57; Cun-
ningham v. Castle, III N. Y. Supp., IO57. The case of Cunningham v.
Castle, supra, has been overruled by Ingraham v. Stockamore, 1x8 N. Y.
Supp., 399, on the ground that the Legislature, by regulating the registra-
tion of automobiles, and requiring licenses for chauffeurs, must have con-
sidered the automobile a vehicle of more than ordinary danger.
CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-NEGLIGENCE OF SERVANTS OF SLEEPING CAR
COMPANY-LIABILITY OF RAILROAD COMPANY.-NELSON V. ILLINOIS CEN-
tRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, 53 So., 6xg (Miss.).-Held, that agents and ser-
vants of a sleeping car company on its cars, which are attached to and
become part of the system of transportation used by a railroad company,
are agents of the railroad company; and if a passenger on such a car is
injured by the negligence of servants of the sleeping car company, the
railroad company is liable in the same way and to the same extent as if
the injury had occurred in its ordinary passenger coaches.
The general rule laid down in the principal case is upheld by the weight
of authority. Railroad Co. v. Ray, 1o Tenn., I; Gannon v. Railroad Co.,
141 Iowa, 37; Railroad Company v. Lipscomb, go Va., 137; Airey v. Pull-
man Co., 5o La. Ann., 648. It has been held that the railroad company's
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liability is limited to acts done by the sleeping car servant in performance
of the carrier's contract of transportation, and does not extend to breaches
of duty pertaining peculiarly to the contract of the Pullman Company.
Calhoun v. Pullman Co., 86 C. C. A., 387; Taber v. Railway Co., 81 S. C.,
317. But other courts hold that the railroad company is liable for all the
acts of the sleeping car servant, done within the scope of his authority.
Dwinelle v. Railroad Co., i2o N. Y., 117; Railway Co. v. Raine, 13o Ky.
454. The reason usually assigned for this rule is that the sleeping car
has been adopted as a part of the railroad company's train, and is under
its control. Railroad Company v. Church, 155 Ala., 329; Railway Co. v.
Perkins, 21 Tex. Civ. App., 5o8. The passenger has a right to assume
that the servants in the sleeping car are the servants of the railroad com-
pany. Thorpe v. Railroad Co., 76 N. Y., 4o2; Railroad Co. v. Walrath,
38 Ohio St., 461. The Railroad Company is not relieved of any of the
duties which it owes the passenger by reason of the passenger making a
separate contract with a sleeping car company for special accommoda-
tions. Campbell v. Railway Co., 83 S. C., 448. Nor can the railroad
company evade any of its duties by entering into any agreement with the
sleeping car company. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 1o2 U. S., 451; Kinsley
v. Railroad Co., 125 Mass., 54.
CONTRACTS-CNTRACrS NOT TO ENGAGE IN BusiNEss-LAxILrrY OF
PARTY.-GALLUP ELECTRIC LIGHT Co. v. PACIFIC IMPROVEMENT CO., 113
PAc., 448 (N. M.).-Held, that under a contract not to engage in business
in competition with the purchaser of property, the party bound is not
precluded from loaning money to others, even though they may use it to
embark in business in competition with the purchaser.
It is well established that whenever there is a contract not to engage
in a business, it is a question of fact and of the construction of the con-
tract, whether or not the party bound has by subsequent action become
liable for breach of the contract. Booth v. Siebold, 37 N. Y. Mic., ior.
However, it has been held, in accord with the principal case, that if one
covenants not to engage in a certain trade he does not violate his con-
tract by merely loaning money to another engaged in such business. 2
High on Injunctions, Sec. 1176, p. 975, 2d ed.; Bird v. Lake, I Hem. &
N., 338. Yet, the intention of the parties must be looked to, and loaning
money to a competing firm to enable them to establish a competing busi-
ness has been held to be a breach under a contract not to engage in busi-
ness directly or indirectly in competition with the purchaser of property.
Davis v. Barney, 2 Gill & J. (Md.), 382. And where adequate damages
cannot be estimated for the breach of such covenant an injunction is the
proper remedy. Baker v. I ottsmeyer, 75 Ind., 451. If a party so con-
tracting attempts to run such business through his representative, as a
subterfuge to escape the penalty of the breach, he will be enjoined. Bar-
rett v. Ainsworth, x56 Mich., 35. Furthermore, neither the mode nor the
rate, nor the name by which defendant calls his business, makes any dif-
ference; the question is, whether or not it is actually a competing busi-
ness and belonging to the defendant. Richardson v. Peacock, 28 N. J. Eq,
Z57.
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DEAD BODIEs-RIGHT OF PossEssIoN-CIviL LIABILITY FOR ILLEGAL ACTS-
DAMAGEs.-HASSARD v. LEHANE, 128 N. Y. Sup., I6r.-Held, that a mother
legally entitled to the possession of the corpse of her son may recover of
one illegally dissecting or otherwise mutilating the remains, damages
measured by the injury of her feelings caused thereby.
Since at common law there could-be no such thing as property in human
remains, in re Brick Presbyterian Church, 3 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.), i55; Bes-
semer Land and Imp. Co. v. Jenkins, ini Ala., 135, no action for civil
damages would lie for injuries to a dead body. 2 Blackstone Comm., 429;
King v. Sharp, 7 Cox C. C., 214. However, according to the modern
rule, property in the nature of a trust is recognized in human remains.
Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 207 Pa. St., 313. And there is a well recognized
rule in the United States of the right of posession of a corpse for Christian
burial in a public cemetery. Page v. Simonds, 63 N. H., 17; Dogert v.
Indianapolis, etc., 13 Ind., 134. Accordingly, the wife may recover
damages for an unauthorized dissection of the husband's body, mental
anguish being an element in determining damages. Larson v. Chase, 47
Minn., 3o7. So a father may recover for an unauthorized autopsy upon
the bddy of his child. Burney v. Childrens Hosp., i69 Mass., 57. Or, the
nearest of kin may recover for the mutilation of a dead body, and the
mentai anguish may be considered in determining damages. Magher v.
Driscoll, 99 Mass., 281; Koeber v. Patik 123 Wis., 453. In Rhode Island
it has been held that while an injury to the possession of a dead body is
not a subject for which the common law would give relief, yet equity will
enjoin any infringment upon such rights. Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery,
io R. I., 227. Furthermore, it is the rule in other jurisdictions that since
there could be no property in the cadavery of an intestate, a personal
representative cannot maintain an action for damages for willful or negli-
gent mutilation of the body, although he may sue for injuries to the wear-
ing apparel to the decedent. Griflith v. Charlotte R. R. Co., 23 S. C., 25.
So, it has also been held that there could be no recovery for mental
anguish caused by the dead body of a relative being thrown from a wagon
by the negligence of a railroad train, where there was no mutilation of the
body. Hockenhammer v. Lexington and E. Ry. Co., 24 Ky. Law Rep.,
2383.
ELECTIONS--CONTEST-JURISDICION.-BRADBURY V. WIGHTMAN, r34 S. W.,
511 (Mo.).-Held, that where a legislative provision gave the courts juris-
diction over contested elections of all public officers, except Governor and
Lieutenant-Governor, and also ordered that the General Assembly should
designate the courts to have such jurisdiction, but the Assembly men-
tioned those public officers, over contests for whose offices the Supreme
Court was to have jurisdiction, specifically by name, and later a public
office was created; that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction over such
office. Graves, J., dissenting.
The case under discussion is based on the maxim,"Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius," that is, the expression of certain things in a statute
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presupposes the exclusion of things not mentioned; Johnson v. Southern
Pa. Co., 117 Fed., 462; Perkins v. Thornburgh, io Cal., x89; and so the
enumeration of property which may be exempted from taxation is a limi-
tation on the power of the legislature to exempt any other property.
Consol. Coal Co. v. Miller, 236 Ill., 149. And it has been held that even
should the court be convinced that some other meaning is intended by the
law-making power and even though literal interpretation should defeat the
purpose of the enactment, yet the statute must be literally construed.
State v. Insurance Co. of North America, 71 Nebr., 32o; Black on Inter-
pretation of Statutes; Ch. 3, Sec. 26. Doe v. Considine; 6 Wall (U. S.),
458. There is, however, strong authority for the proposition that the
above-mentioned maxim should not be permitted to defeat the intention
of a legislature; Swick v. Coleman, 218 Ill., 33, and so it has been held
that when a statute read, "whether the second marriage shall take place
in England or elsewhere." This has been held to apply to places outside
the King's dominions, Rex v. Russell (igoi), A. C., 446 (overruling,
MacLeod v. Att'y.-General of U. S. Wales (i89x), A. C., 455. This is
especially held to be true when a class of things is mentioned and a new
office of such class has come into existence since the passage of a statute.
State v. Frederickson, ior Me., 37; Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 13 Allen
(Mass.), 247; Keith v. Quinney, I Ore., 364. It has also been held that
the meaning of one statute may be supplied by reference to another statute.
Commonwealth v. Goding, 3 Met. (Mass.), 13o; United Societies v. Bank,
7 Conn., 456. So it seems also that the intention of a legislature, when so
discovered, must be followed though contrary to the letters of the statute.
Sedgwick on Com. and Stat. Law, 232, and this extension of interpretation
applies especially when the act deals with a genus, the later office being a
species. Reg. v. Smith, L. R., I C. C., rio; Lane v. Cotton, 12 Modern,
485, and thus a statute authorizing counties to* take stock in railroads
was held applicable to stock of railroads formed under a subsequent
statute. Stebbins v. Pueblo Co., 2 McCrary (U. S.), 196.
ELECTION OF REmEIs-AcTs CONSTITUTING ELECTION-IN RE DYE'S
EsTATE-113 PAC., 839 (N. M.).-Held, that an appeal from a judgment
dismissing an action by an heir to revoke the probate of a will on the
ground of infancy is not abandoned because the heir, when of age, brings
a second suit to revoke the probate. Wright and Roberts, JJ., dissenting.
The case under discussion is in opposition to the rule that a party who
prosecutes a second suit for the same cause, after judgment against him
on the first suit, waives his right to prosecute further the former suit.
Ehrman v. Astoria R. R., 26 Ore. 377; Moore v. Floyd, 4 Ore., ioI;
Liebuck v. Stahle, 66 Iowa 749. Especially does this hold good when the
complainant's bill has been abated and he files another bill in the same
court, and during its pendency sues out a writ of error to a higher court.
Carr v. Casey, 2o Ill. 637. Nor can a party prosecute his appeal from a
judgment at law and his petition in chancery at the same time, and if he
so does, the appeal at law is waived. Gordon v. Ellison, 9 Iowa, 317.
The same under consideration, however, finds some support in the doctrine
that no act is so decisive as to constitute a conclusive election unless the
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remedial right on which the act is based is wholly irreconcilable with the
remedial right which the subsequent action seeks to enforce. Conner v.
Palinquist, 6z Ill., App. 551; Heidelbach v. Na'l Bank, 33 N. Y. Supp.
794. And it has been held that where a plaintiff has recovered judgment,
realizing merely a nominal sum, that this does not preclude his asserting
in a subsequent action that he has a lien on the personalty of the defend-
ant. Wemple v'. Hawenstein, 46 N. Y., Supp. 288. So a suit on a note
against a corporation is no bar to a second suit against the signers of the
note who were officials of the corporation. Bank of Brooklyn h. Wallis,
32 N. Y., Supp. 381.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-ATTORNEY OF ADMINISTRATION-
RiGHT TO COMPENsATIoN.-GOODMAN v. GRvrrITH, x34 S. W., 1051 (Mo.).-
Held, that an attorney does not forfeit his right to compensation from the
estate for services rendered the administrator and his wife in presenting
a claim in their favor against decedent's estate. Norton J., dissenting.
Subject to the general requirement of good faith and reasonable pru-
dence, an executor or administrator is entitled to employ and pay an attor-
ney for advice in reference to the management of the estate. Smyley v.
Reese, 53 Ala., 89; Roll v. Mason, 9 Ind., App. 65r. An attorney's fees
contracted in procuring letters of administration is not a proper charge
against the estate. Wilbur v. Wilbur, x7 Wash., 683; In re Byrne's Estate,
122 Cal., 260. But such fees are allowed an executor in contesting a will.
Bradley v. Andress, 30 Ala., 8o; Bratney v. Curry, 33 Ind., 399; contra,
In re Parson's Estate, 65 Cal. 24o. But where legal proceedings are made
necessary by wrongful acts of the administrator or executor then the
attorney cannot collect his fees from the estate. Jacoway v. Hall, 67 Ark.,
340; Ross v. Battle, 113 Ga., 742. And contrary to the principal case, an
estate is not chargeable with the services of an attorney which are
rendered .an administrator as an individual. Wilkinson v. Ward, 42 Ill.,
App. 541; Noble v. Jackson, 132 Ala., 230. But where it concerns him
both personally and officially it is proper to apportion the counsel fees.
Roll v. Mason, 9 Ind., App. 651; Nelson v. Bush, 9 Dana (Ky.), 1o4.
GAMING-AcTION TO REcovER MONEY LOST-PAYMENT.-MANN V. GOR-
DON, no PAc., 1043 (N. M.).-Held, that a plaintiff who engaged in a
gambling transaction, and paid his loss by check some six weeks later,
could recover under a statute providing that any person losing money at
gambling might recover. Wright and Parker, JJ., dissenting.
The general common law rule is to the effect that money lost at gaming,
when the parties are in pari delicto, may not be recovered. Weyburn v.
White, 22 Barb. (N. Y.), 82; West v. Holmes, 26 Vt., 530, though equity
might grant relief to the loser; Thomas v. Watson, 9 Md. 536, note, and
would not allow the innocent indorsee of a note given for gaming to sue
the drawer. Talbot v. Hubble, 2 Strange, 1154. By statute, however, in
some jurisdictions, the loser may recover at law. Jacob v. Clark, riS Ky.,
255; Trumbo v. Finley, 18 S. C., 305. But the majority opinion in the
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case under discussion is contrary to the general American and English
rule, that money subsequently and voluntarily paid after a transaction,
with full knowledge of the facts, cannot be recovered, though the claim
was invalid. Cobden v. Kendrick, 4 Durnford & East T. R., 431; Flower
v. Lance, 59 N. Y., 6o3; Beecher v. Buckingham, 18 Conn., uio. Even
though more was paid than was allowed by law. Selby v. U. S., 47 Fed.,
8oo. Nor can a set-off be maintained under such circumstances. U. S. v.
Clement & Newman, Crabbe, 499.
INNKEEPER-LOSS OF PROPERTY OF GUEST-CARE REQUIRED OF INN-
KEEPER.-GImLYN v. HAUF, 126 N. Y., SUP. 58.-Held, that-where a guest
left a hotel in October, i9o8, in debt to the proprietor, claiming to have
left a chest with its contents, and made no inquiry about it until Novem-
ber, igog, when she tendered the amount of her debt and demanded
delivery of the chest, and made no efforts to have its whereabouts dis-
covered until March, i9io, such unexcused delay is sufficient to throw
upon the guest the burden of proving actuial negligence on the part of the
innkeeper in failing to keep and restore the property left. Giegerich, J.,
dissenting.
The prevailing view is that he is liable like the carrier, for all goods
of the guest lost in the inn, unless the loss happened by act of God, or a
public enemy, or by fault of the owner. Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick.
(Mass.), 28o; Cunningham v. Bucky, 42 W. Va., 671. Whatever view is
adopted, it is agreed that upon loss or injury to the goods being shown,
the innkeeper is prima facie, and the burden is on him of establishing such
facts as will exonerate him. Howe Mach. Co. v. Rease, 49 Vt., 477. It is
generally held that after the relation of guest ceases, the innkeeper appears
liable only as an ordinary bailee for the goods his departing guest may
have left in his care. Adams v. Clem, 41 Ga., 665. According to one view
the liability of an innkeeper in such cases is merely that of a gratuitous
bailee, who is responsible only for gross negligence. O'Brien v. Vaill, 22
Fla., 627. But some cases show a tendency to enlarge the liability of the
innkeeper under such circumstances, beyond that of a bailee without com-
pensation, and to hold him liable as a bailee holding property upon which
he has a lien as a security for a sum due so as to be bound for ordinary
care. Giles v. Fauntleroy, 13 Md., 126. So some courts hold, where a
guest pays his bill and departs, leaving his property behind, the innkeeper
is merely a gratuitous bailee of the party, and in case of its loss is only
liable for gross negligence. Miller v. Peeples, 6o Miss., 819; O'Brien v.
Vail, supra. But other cases hold he is responsible for want of ordinary
care. Murray v. Marshall, 9 Colo., 482. And where the guest leaves
without paying his bill, the innkeeper is only liable as a gratuitous bailee
for goods left with him. Lawrence v: Howard, I Utah, 142. As a general
rule it would seem that a guest does not have to prove negligence of the
innkeeper in order to hold him liable. Burrows v. Trieber, 21 Md., 320;
Carter v. Hobbs, 12 Mich., 52.
INSURANcE-MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSociATIoN-RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY.-
SAVAGE V. MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA, 113 PAC., 802 (KANs.).-Held,
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that where the designation of a person as beneficiary in a mutual benefit
association is made in pursuance of an agreement, founded upon sufficient
consideration, the person so designated cannot be changed by the member,
unless by reason of countervailing equities, although the rules of the order
permit the member to change the beneficiary at will
There is some conflict of authority as to the right of a member of a
mutual benefit association to change the beneficiary originally designated
The weight of authority is, however, that such act is permissible. Hoept v.
Supreme Lodge K. of H., 113 Cal., 91; Carpenter v. Knapp, roi Iowa
712; Ingersoll v. Knights of Golden Rule, 47 Fed., 272; Book v. Book, i
Ont. L R., 86. But there is authority for the view that the beneficiary
acquires a vested interest, as in an ordinary insurance policy. Weisert v.
Nuell, 81 Ky., 336; Love v. Clune, 24 Colo., 237; Black v. Valley Mutual,
52 Ark., 2o. Especially if the constitution or the certificate itself gives
no power to change the original beneficiary. Locomotive Engineers v.
Winterstein, 58 N. J. Eq. i89; Johnson v. Hall, 55 Ark., 874. Neverthe-
less, some jurisdictions, which hold generally that the member may change
the beneficiary, rule that this power is lost in the case of a contract between
the member and the beneficiary. Carter v. Carter, 35 Ind., App. 73; Smith
v. N. B. Society, 123 N. Y., 85. And so the member cannot change the
beneficiary when named in consideration of past, present, or future
advances. McGraw v. McGraw, i9o Ill., 6o4; Leaf v. Leaf. 92 Ky. 166.
Nor when the beneficiary promises to pay the assessments and does so.
Maynard v. Vanderwerker, 24 N. Y., Sup. 932. There are, however, cases
which hold that even in the case of contracts, such as above, the member
retains the right to change the beneficiary, whose remedy is solely for the
breach of the agreement with him. Sabin v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W.,
6 N. Y., St. Rep. 151; Sovereign Camp W. W. v. Broadwell, 114 Mo.
App. 47 r, on the ground that the power of appointment is a matter between
him and the lodge and cannot be limited by his contract with a third per-
son. Learned v. Tallmadge, 26 Barb. (N. Y.), 444.
JUDGmENT-REs JUDICATA-ACQUITTAL OF CRIMINAL OFFENSE-STATE V.
ROACHr, 112 PAC., 15O (KAN.).-Held, that an acquittal upon a criminal
charge is not a bar to a civil action brought against the defendant by the
state, although, in order to recover, it must prove him to have been guilty
of the offense.
This rule is not based on the mere fact that one proceeding is criminal
and the other civil, but on the fact that in the criminal proceeding defend-
ant's guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, while in the civil
action a fair preponderance of evidence is sufficient. U. S. v. Donald-
Shulz Co., 148 Fed., 581; State v. Bradnack, 69 Conn., 212; Riker v'.
Hooper, 35 Vt., 457. As a general rule, a judgment rendered on the merits
by a court of competent jurisdiction precludes and bars subsequent litiga-
tion between the same parties, or their privies, on the same cause of action.
Oman v. Stone Co., x34 Fed., 64; Stearns v. Fire Ins. Co., 124 Mass., 61.
Furthermore, the constitutional provision that no man shall be twice
punished for the same offense has been held to bar the state from bring-
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a civil action to enforce another penalty against a defendant who has
been convicted of the same offense in a criminal proceeding. Coffey v.
U. S., 1x6 U. S., 436. But this decision has been limited by the case of
Stone v. U. S., 167 U. S., 178, so that it does not apply where the purpose
of the civil action is dissimilar from that of the criminal proceeding. The
rule laid down in the case of Stone v. U. S., supra, has been upheld in a
great many cases. State v. Meek, 112 Iowa, 338; In re Campbell, 197,
Pa., 582; In re Attorney, 86 N. Y. 563; McGrath v. Board of Excise, i8
N. Y., Sup. 884; State v. Miller, 48 Me., 576; State V. Corron, 73 N. H.,
434. It is well settled that a judgment in a civil proceeding is no bar to
a civil action brought by an individual against the same defendant, since
a private wrong inflicted by a criminal act is not merged in the public
wrong, nor is the public prosecution intended to supersede or preclude the
private action. Fowle v. Child, 164 Mass., 210; Breinig v. Brienig, 26
Pa. i61. The weight of authority is that such a judgment is inadmissible
as evidence in the civil action. Doyle v. Gore, 15 Mont., 212; Railway Co.
v. O'Quin, i24 Ga., 357; contra, Bankston v. Folks, 38 La. Ann., 267.
JUDGMENT-TRANSFER TAXES-FFECT OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN
ANOTHER STATE.-IN RE CummixGs' ESTATE, 127.N. Y., Sup. og.-Held,
that in a proceeding to impose a transfer tax on a resident decedents
estate, the state is not bound by a decision in another state, in a proceed-
ing to which it was not a party, that decedent resided there and that his
personalty was distributable according to the laws there. Ingraham, J.,
dissenting.
Under the Constitution of the United States each state is bound to give
full faith and credit to the judgment of the courts of other states in the
Union. But the constitutional provision does not require that one state
shall within its territory, enforce the laws of another state. Dunham v.
Dunham, 57 Ill., App. 475. The judgments of sister states are given,
generally, the same effect as they have in the states where they were
rendered and no more. Cannon v. Brame, 45 Ala., 262; Bank of North
America v. Wheeler, 28 Conn., 433. In no case, however, are they given
effect where the court had no jurisdiction. Jones v. Warner, 8i Ill., 343;
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S., 714. And a court's determination of its own
jurisdiction is not final. Sheldon v. Wabash R. Co., io5 Felt., 785. It is
the general rule that two states cannot tax at the same time the same
property, nor has a state jurisdiction to tax property and interests lying
outside of its borders. Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall, 267. Real estate
is governed by the law of the situs and being subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of the state where it is situated cannot be directly affected
by the judgment of a court of another state. Clarke's Appeal, 70 Conn.,
I95; Cooper v. Hayes, 96 Ind., 386. Tangible personal property situated
within a state can be taxed without regard to the residence of the owner.
People v. Board of Trustees, 48 N. Y., 39o. And it seems that the same
rule governs in the case of transfer and inheritance taxes. In re Lord's
Estate, 97 N. Y., Sup. 553; In re Lewis' Estate, 203 Pa., 211.
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LIMB AND SLANDERi-WORDS AcIIONABLE-ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADING.-
CAR ENTEs V. GRIMES PASS MINING Co., 114 PAC., 42 (IDAHo).-Held, that
the ends of justice and the public good can be best served by allowing
litigants to freely plead any material matter in a judicial proceeding to
which they are parties, holding them accountable only for defamatory
matter which is neither pertinent nor material to the issue under inquiry.
The weight of authority supports the proposition laid down in the
principal case. Dunn v. Southern Ins. Co., i6 La. 431; McGehee v. Insur-
ance Co., 112 Fed., 853; Kemper v. Fort, 219 Pa. 85. This rule applies
also to words spoken by counsel during the course of the trial; Maulsby
v. Reifsnider, 69 Md., x43; White v. Carroll, 42 N. Y., 161; and to
remarks of a complainant who is conducting a prosecution before a justice
of the peace in behalf of the Commonwealth. Hoar v. Wood, 3 Metc.
(Mass.), z93. In England, statements made during a trial are absolutely
privileged, regardless of their relevancy. Munster v. Lamb, Ii Q. B. D.,
588; Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3, Ex. =2o. But in America, when the
words are not pertinent and material, the rule of protection does not apply.
Moore v. Nat'l. Bank, 123 N. Y., 42o; King v. McKissick, 126 Fed., 215.
A mere averment that the statements were false and malicious, without
alleging that they were not pertinent and material, is insufficient. Harting
v. Shaw, 130 Mich., 177. Defendant may show that he believed in good
faith that they were pertinent and material, and thus rebut the presump-
tion of malice. Burdette v. Argile, 94 Ill., App. 171. But where the
statements were clearly impertinent, defendant cannot justify by showing
his belief that they were true. McGlaughlin v. Cowley, 127 Mass., 36.
The cardinal inquiry is whether the matter was pertinent to the issue in-
volved. Crockett v. McLanahan, iog Tenn. 5r7. This is a question of law
for the court. Harlow v. Carroll, 6 App. D. C., i28; Jones v. Brownlee,
x6r Mo., 258. In Louisiana, it has been held that defamatory judicial
allegations are not libelous and actionable, unless shown to have been
false, malicious, and without probable cause. Lescale v. Schwarz, 1x8 La.,
718. When libelous matter is contained in pleadings prepared by an attor-
ney, it will be presumed, until the contrary is shown, that his client
authorized the act. Insurance Co. v. Thomas, 83 Fed., 8o3. The privilege
given by this rule applies only to publication during the frial; hence a
newspaper which wrongfully publishes a slanderous account of a judicial
proceeding is liable. Park v. Free Press Co., 72 Mich., 56o.
RAILROADS-INJURIES TO TREPASSERS-USE OF RIGHT OF WAY.-SOUTH-
ERN Ry. Co. v." WiLrY, 7o S. E., 51o (VA.).-Held, that where railroad
tracks have long been used as a pathway with the knowledge and acquies-
cence of the company, it was bound to keep a reasonable lookout for per-
sons upon the track.
A person who, without permission, walks upon the tracks of a railroad
company, is a trespasser, though the portion of the track where he walks
is habitually used by pedestrians. Eggmann v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R.
Co., 47 Ill., App. 5o7. Nor does the mere acquiescence on the part of a
company in the use of its track by the public confer -any right to use the
same. Wilmurth's Adm'r. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 25 Ky. Law Rep., 67r. But
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in some jurisdictions if the use of the tracks continues habitually, with
the company's knowledge and without its objection, it is sufficient to con-
stitute the person so using it a licensee. Minot v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 74
N. H., 23o; Swift v. Staten Island Rapid Transit R. Co., 123 N. Y., 645.
And in respect to trespassers on the track of the company the weight of
authority holds that there is no positive duty owing them. Terre Haute,
etc., R. Co. v. Graham, 95 Ind., 286; contra, Carter v. Columbfa, etc., R.
Co., 19 S. C., 20. In some jurisdictions the English rule is
adopted, that the company is not liable except, after becoming
aware of the party's danger, reasonable care was not exercised
to prevent injury. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Black, 89 Ala., 313; Burnett
v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., x6 Neb., 332. And the general rule is that a
railroad company is not bound to keep a lookout for trespassers. Terre
Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Graham, 95 Ind., 286; Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Stroud,
64 Miss., 784. In most jurisdictions, in accordance with the principal
case, the company is under the duty of using reasonable care to discover
and avoid injuring trespassers whom it has reason to anticipate may be on
the tracks. Corbett v. Oregon Short Line Co., 25 Utah, 449; Brown v.
Boston, etc., R. Co., 73 N. H., 568. Other jurisdictions hold that actual
knowledge must be imputed to the company in order to render the com-
pany liable for lack of reasonable care. Cheney v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., i6
Hun. (N .Y.), 415; Erie R. Co. v. McCormick, 69 Ohio St., 45.
REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTs-DEEDs-PARTIES ENTITLED TO SUE.-
GREER v. WATSON, 54 So., 487 (ALA.) .- Held, that a subsequent purchaser
may sue to correct a mistake in the description of land made in the con-
veyance by the original grantor.
The rule laid down by the principal case is supported by the weight of
authority. Sicher v. Rambousek, 193 Mo., 113; Stewart v. Brand, 23 Iowa,
477; Gwyer v. Spaulding, 33 Neb., 573; Hill v. Clark, 32 Ky. L. Rep., 595;
May v. Adams, 58 Vt., 74. Where a mistake in the description of land
occurs in a series of conveyances under such circumstances as would
entitle any one of the vendees to a reformation as against his immediate
vendor, the last vendee is entitled to a reformation against the original
vendor. Blackburn v. Randolph, 33 Ark., xig. But the fact that the sub-
sequent grantee has this right does not bar the first grantee from bringing
the suit. Tillis v. Smith, io8 Ala., 264. In Colorado it is held that the
right to sue for reformation of a deed cannot be transferred merely by a
conveyance of the land, and that such a suit must be brought by the origi-
nal grantee, unless he has expressly assigned it to another. Norris v.
Honestone Co., 2 Col., 162. The right of the sub-vendee to reformation
of a deed will be enforced against a judgment creditor of the original
grantor, and will displace the apparent. lien of the judgment on the land
omitted from the deed. Willis v. Gattman, 53 Miss., 721; Blackburn v.
Randolph, supra. But equity will not grant such relief against one who
has purchased the land in dispute from the original grantor, for value and
without notice. Willis v. Sanders, 51 N. Y. 384. One who shows no rights
under a deed has no equity to have it reformed. Rowley v. Towsley, 53
Mich., 329; Gould V. Glass, 12o Ga., 5o. Hence a deed will not be
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reformed at the suit of a sub-vendee who has notice of the fact that the
purchase price has not been paid, and who does not tender payment of
same. Hagman v. Shaffner, 88 Mo., 25. Where a mistake is made in
describing land in a deed, but subsequent grantors describe it correctly,
the last vendee is not entitled to use the original grantor for reformation,
since there is no privity between the parties as to the mistake. Jackson
v. Lucas, 157 Ala., Si. The statute of limitations does not begin to run
against a bona fide purchaser without notice until the mistake is discovered
and brought to his knowledge. Hart v. Walton, 9 Cal. App., 5o2.
TRADE-MARxs AND NAmEs-UNFAiR COmPETTIoN-TEsT.-A. Y.
McDoNALD & MoRRisoN MFG. Co. *v. H. MULLER MFa. Co., 183 FED, 972.-
Held, that the test of unfair competition by the imitation of labels or
marks, is not whether a difference can be recognized when the goods are
placed side by side, but whether, when they are not side by side, an
ordinary prudent person would be liable to purchase the one, believing that
he was purchasing the other.
The general rule is in accord with the principal case, in that it does not
constitute a practical and valid test that dissimilarities appear only wlen
the articles are placed side by side. Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Lowell Hosiery
Mills, x26 Mass., 325; Monol Tobacco Works v. Gensior, 32 N. Y. Misc.,
87; Potter v. McPherson, 21 Hun. (N. Y.), 559. And the weight of
authority is to the effect that the similarity must be such that would
deceive the ordinary prudent purchaser exercising ordinary care. Van
Camp Packing Co. v. Cruikshanks Bros., go Fed., 814; Gannet v.
Ruppert, ii9 Fed., 814. A considerable number of cases have gone
farther, however, and held that it is an infringment when the similarity
be such as is calculated to mislead even ignorant and unwary purchasers
that are not cautious. Brooklyn White Lead Co. v. Masury, 25 Barb.
(N. Y.), 416; Colman v. Crump, 7o N. Y., 573. In the case of Mossler v.
Jacobs, 66 Ill. App., 57r, an injunction was sustained preventing the use of
the words "Six Big Tailors" as being so simlar to the name of "Six
Little Tailors" as to deceive the unwary purchaser. Dissimilarities such
as only an expert would detect are infringments. R. Heinisch's Sons Co.
v. Baker, 86 Fed., 765. But letters or figures applied to merchandise
by a manufacturer, for discriptive purposes alone, can not be appropriated
b him for his exclusive use as a trade-mark. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v.
Trainer, 1oi U. S., 51. Furthermore, regard must be taken as to the
class of persons who purchase the particular article and the fact that goods
are of a class purchased by persons who are easily deceived is a circum-
stance to be considered. W. K. Fairbanks Co. v. R. W. Bell Mfg. Co., 77
Fed. Rep., 869; Rickitt v. Kellogg, 28 N. Y. App. Div., ii.
TRIAL-DEMuRRER To EViDENCE-CONFLICTING EVIDENCE.-WINGFIELD V.
MCCLINTOCK, 113 PAC., 394. (KAN.).-Held, that on the trial of a case,
where there is conflicting evidence on the one hand tending to establish
a material fact, and, on the other to disprove it, it is error for the court
to sustain a demurrer to evidence, however strongly in the opinion of the
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court the preponderance of evidence may be against the party on whom
rests the burden of the issues. Burch, J., dissenting.
The principal case is sustained by several other cases. Jansen v. City
of Atchison, x6 Kan., 358; Howard v. Blythe, 32 Tex., 8oo; Gregory v.
Nesbit, 35 Ky. (5 Dana), 419. But, although there are no cases to the
contrary, the cases supra, either expressly or impliedly, held that there is
no distinction between a demurrer to evidence and a motion for non-suit.
The question raised by a motion for non-suit is, whether or not the points
raised by the evidence are competent to support the issue, and not whether
the evidence is sufficient to support these points. Bridger v. Ashville &
Spartanburg Ry. Co., 25 S. C., 24; Munroe v. Williams, 35 S. C., 572.
The question raised by a demurrer to evidence is whether or not the facts
of the evidence, granting them to be true, support the issue. United States
v. Smith, 24 U. S. (xi Wheat), 171; Gates v. Nobles, 1 Root (Conn.),
344; Humphrey's Admr. v. West's Admrs., 3 Rand (Va.), 516. Hence
one raises the question of the competency of facts if established, the other
the sufficiency of the facts though competent.
It is well settled that a motion for non-suit can not be sustained if there
is a conflict of evidence or a question of fact to be determined. Chi. & N.
W. Ry. Co. v. Olney, 71 Fed., 95; Wheaton v. Newcombe, 48 N. Y.
Super. (16 J. & S.), 215. It is equally well settled that the legal sufficiency
of evidence is a question of law exclusively for the court. Cuikshank v.
Fourth Nat. Bank, 26 Fed., 584; Belt v. Marriott, 9 Gill (Md.), 331;
Thalheimer v. Lamont, 9 N. Y. St. Rep., 439. In the end, a demurrer to
evidence admits the truth of all the plaintiff's evidence-which would elimi-
nate the conflict-and considers it in the most favorable light possible for
the plaintiff. Thornton v. Bank of Washington, 28 U. S. (3 Pet.), 36;
Dormandy v. State Bank, 3 Ill. (2 Scram.), 236; Patrick v. Hallet, i Johns
(N. Y.), 241.
WITNESSES-CREDIDILITY-EvIDENCE.--CITY OF MONTGOMERY V. WYCHE,
53 So., 86 (ALA.).-Held, that where a plaintiff sueing for a personal in-
jury tesified that he believed in the existence of physical pain, evidence
that he was a Christian Scientist, and as such, denied in his religious be-
lief the existence of pain, was properly excluded, if introduced to impeach
his credibility.
The general American rule agrees with the case under discussion, and
holds that laws providing that no person shall be incompetent to testify
on account of his religious belief, have been interpreted to prevent any
inquiry into that belief for the purpose of affecting credibility. State v.
Scheleusky, 128 Ill. App., i; People v. Copsey, 71 Cal., 548. Such laws as
referred to have generally been passed throughout the country. State
Const. of Cal., Preamble, Art 1, 3; N. H. Const., Bill of Rights, Art. 5;
Alabama Const., Sec. 3, and so it has been held that it could not be shown,
for the purpose of discrediting a witness' testimony, that he did not be-
lieve in God. Dickinson v. Beal, ro Kan. App., 233. Nor can the testi-
mony of a child, otherwise competent, be impeached because it could know
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nothing of God. White v. Conron, 96 Ky. x8o. And it has been held that
a witness who has made former statements of his belief, can not be im-
peached for retraction. People v. lenness, 5 Mich., 3o5. The leading
case in opposition to the case under consideration holds that a witness may
be interrogated as to the existence of a God, and that it may thus be
shown that he does not realize the importance of false swearing, making a
distinction between his competency and his credibility. Staubro v. Hop-
kins, 28 Barb. N. Y. 26_r The English rule is in accord with this. King
v. Taylor, Peake's Cases II. In one American state it is held that it is a
question of fact for the judge whether a person who does not believe in
a deity is competent to testify. Free v. Buckingham, 59 N. H., 219.
